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Plaintiff and

Re~pondent,

: Case
No.

R. SEYMOUR,

~\VRENCE

10596

Defendant and Appellant . :

- -------------APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF
CASE
This is an action in which the appellant
'Nas ch;:irged for the crime of attempting to obtain
r::cney by means of false pretenses, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter l, Section 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury. From ·a
verdict of guilty, and sentence of the Court, the
appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a. reversal of the
conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 10, 1964, a Complaint was
filed against the defendant charging him with the
crime of attempting to obtain money by means of
false pretenses. ( R. 3) A warrant of arrest was
issued and the appellant appeared without counsel
before the Honorable: Horace C. Beck, Judge of the
City Court of Salt Lake, Salt Lake Col.lnty, State of

Utah on August 11, 19 64.

( R. 3)

The arraign-

ment was continued to August 18, 1964, to afford
the accused an opportunity to secure counsel., (R. 3)

-3and he was placed in the County Jail.
On August 18, 1964, appellant again
appeared before the Court without counsel. Hearing was set for October 8, at which time appellant
was present without counsel and the Court continued the matter to November 12, to give appellant
further opportunity to secure counsel. ( R. 3) On
November 12, 1964 appellant had still not

obtaine~

counsel and the Court set the next hearing date for
December 3. Prior to that hearing, the appellant
wrote to Judge Beck a letter ( R. 4) , part of which
reads as follows:
" So now as a result, of my car being
looted while supposedly under city
protection-- I will not be able to
obtain my own counsel- and because
of my past record- the limited work
court appointed counsel can do-- I have
no other choice but to accept same,
waive the hearing-- and plead guilty"
{R .10) ( Underline ours)

-4On December 3rd, 19 64, appellant was
brought before the Court without counsel. The
Minute Entry reads as follows:
"December 3, 19 64, Defendant
presented without counsel. Upon
advice of his counsel, Ken
Hisatake, defendant waived his
preliminary hearing, the State
consenting thereto. Court
ordered defendant bound over to
District Court to stand trial.
Court ordered bail $2, 000. 00."
Appellant was arraigned on December 14,
1964 in District Court and entered a plea of Not
Guilty. ( R. 18). Prior to the commencement of
trial, appellant's trial counsel moved the Court to
qua sh the information upon the ground that appellant was without counsel at the preliminary
hearing. ( R. 40) The motion was denied and appellant was convicted upon jury trial of attempting
to obtain money by means of false pretenses as
charged in the information. ( R. 19-A)
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At the conclusion of trial, appellant moved
the Court for a new trial upon the basis that he was
not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, contrary to Article I, Sec. 12 of the Utah
Constitution and in violation of the due process
laws under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States . ( R. 21)
Thereafter, appellant's trial counsel withdrew and
~he

Court appointed this writer to represent appellant

as counsel for purposes of the motion. ( R. 24, 25)
Argument was heard by the Court and the motion
was continued to secure an Affidavit from attorney
Hisatake regarding his purported services in appellant's behalf at the preliminary hearing. The
affidavit was submitted ( R. 29) wherein attorney
Hisatake deposed that he neither appeared as counsel for appellant at the preliminary hearing nor did he
advise appellant to waive preliminary hearing.

-6Appellant's motion for a new trial was taken under
advisement and subsequently denied. ( R. 31)
This appeal was taken therefrom.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE FAILURE TO FURNISH THE
AID OF COUNSEL AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
STAGE, AND TO ACCEPT APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF
PRELIMINARY HEARING WIT HO UT THE APPEARANCE
OF COUNSEL IN HIS BEHALF OR WAIVER THEREOF,
VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT I AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION I
SECTIONS 7 AND 12

I

ARTICLE I.

It is a fundamental concept of state and

federal constitutional law that an accused has the
right to the appointment of counsel sufficiently in
advance of trial to permit the effective preparation
for trial. This is an element of due process of law

-7guaranteed the accused by the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell v Alabama, 28 7 U. S. 45 ( 19 32).
A similar provision is embodied in Article I, Sections

7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. Although these

constitutional provisions are far sweeping in their
language, it has been settled law that the guarantee
of counsel does not apply to every step in the criminal
prosecution, but only to what has come to be denominated, with some circularity

11

critical stages

11

of the criminal proceeding.
It has been held that arraignment could be

considered a " critical stage

11

in a criminal proceeding

in the case of Hamilton v Alabama, 368 U. S. 52,
( 19 61) . Title 7 7-22-12, Ulah Code Annotated, 19 5 3,
similarly provides that the right to counsel is
applicable to the arraignment in Utah.
In 19 63, the United States Supreme Court
examined the question whether a preliminary hearing

-8was such a

" critical stage" in a criminal proceeding

as to require the appointment of counsel. White v
Maryland, 3 73 U. S. 59 ( 1963).

In that case, the

accused, unrepresented by counsel at a preliminary
hearing, entered a plea of guilty to a capital offense
and that plea was offered in evidence against him at
the trial after he had, on advice of counsel, pleaded
not guilty at arraignment. The court held that Hamilton v Alabama, supra, required reversal of the conviction even though the Maryland Court of Appeals
had declared that under state law the accused had
not been required to plead at the preliminary hearing
nor were any rights or defenses preserved or lost at
that time. White v State, 177, A. 2d 8 77, 881-82
(Md. 1961). In its decision, the U. S. Supreme
Court compared the critical stage of an arraignment
to that of a preliminary hearing in the following
language:

-9Whatever may be the normal function
of the 'preliminary hearing r under
Maryland law, it was in this case
as 'critical' a stage as arraignment
under Alabama law. For petitioner
entered a plea before the magistrate
and that plea was taken at a time
when he had no counsel.
11

" We repeat what we said in
Hamilton v Alabama... that we do
not stop to determine whether
prejudice resulted: ' Only the
presence of counsel could have
enabled this accused to know all
the defenses available to him
and to plead intelligently• II r
373U.S. 59, 60.
The distinction between capital and noncapital offenses concerning the right to counsel at
trial seems likely to have been erased in the case
of Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963). As
Justice Clark observed in his concurring opinion,
"The constitution makes no distinction
between capital and non-capital cases.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires due
process of law for the deprival of 'liberty'
just as for the deprival of 'life' and there

-10cannot constitutionally be a difference
in the quality of the process based
merely upon a supposed difference in
the sanction involved."
3 72 u • s • 335 I 349 •
An examination of the record in the instant

case does not require an over-extension of the foregoing authorities to support a reversal of the conviction. Appellant remained 115 days in the county
j:oil from the time of his arrest on August 10, 1964
until he was bound over to the District Court. During
all of this time he was unable to secure counsel. The
record does not reveal the appearance of counsel in
behalf of appellant at any proceeding before the
magistrate. In total despair, the appellant wrote to
Judge Beck ( R. 4-lOJ stating he would waive preliminary hearing, accept Court appointed counsel
and plead gl.Il1ty.
~he

Thereafter, on December 3, 1964,

magistrate permitted the appellant to waive pre -

lirninary hearing but did not appoint counsel for
him prior to accepting the waiver.

The failure of the

-11-

court to comply with appellant's request for court
appointed counsel, or the failure of the court to
appoint counsel on its own motion when appellant
agreed to waive his right to a critical stage in the
criminal proceeding constituted a violation of the
appellant's constitutional rights.
The minute entry in the City Court ( R. 3)
states that appellant's waiver of the preliminary
hearing was upon advice of attorney Hisatake, implying that appellant had counsel at that hearing.
Mr. Hisatake denied having given this advice. ( R. 29)
In any event, no appearance was made by Mr.
Hisatake either personally or by pleading at any
phase of the criminal proceeding before the magistrates court. The Court's willingness to accept a
waiver of the hearing without counsel under these
circumstances and particularly after appellant had
requested court- appointed counsel was a violation

-12of constitutional rights of appellant.
Some courts have held that the absence
of counsel at the preliminary hearing is not a
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights
~f

the absence of counsel is not, in the eyes of the

court, prejudicial. People v Daniels 199 N. E. 2d
33, (Ill. 1964). It would appear that Utah has previously followed this line of reasoning in State v
Braasch, 119 U 450, 229 P2d 289 ( 1951).
"*** Thus, at the preliminary hearing
the state ought to provide counsel for
any defendant desiring but unable to
procure counsel for himself. This
should have been made clear to defendants before they decided whether
they were ready for that hearing.
"But under the circumstances of this
case such failure did not constitute
prejudicial error.*** The defendant
must be present at a preliminary
hearing and is always entitled to
counsel which, if necessary, the state
must provide. *** Under such circumstances a preliminary hearing without
counsel is only invalid where prejudice
is shown."

-13In most, if not all instances an insurmountable burden is imposed upon an accused to
show prejudice where he has waived preliminary
hearing in the absence of counsel. He may claim
that without counsel he does not know whether to
demand or waive a hearing or how to cross examine
witnesses and is not prepared to effectively discuss
with

t~.e

prosecuting attorney possible reduction of the

charges against him. He may claim that he is incapable of benefitting from the value of the preliminary hearing as a discovery device as emphasized
in Washington v Clemmer, 339 F 2d 715 ( D. C. Cir.
1964).

Or he may claim that without counsel he was

unaware that the state had the burden at the preliminary hearing to establish probable cause to
believe that the defendant was guilty of the crime
charged and that failure by the state to meet this
burden must result in the discharge of the defendant.

-14These generalities as to the benefits of
counsel at the preliminary hearing stage of the
criminal proceeding are usually insufficient, however, to show prejudice where counsel has not been
L..:mished the defendant at that phase of the prosecution.

Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused

to consider the element of prejudice when a constitutional right has been denied.
"In this case, as in those, the degree
of prejudice can never be known. Only
the presence of counsel could have
enabled this accused to know all the
defenses available to him and to plead
intelligently~' Hamilton v Alabama, supra.
" We repeat what we said in Hamilton v
Alabama. . • that we do not stop to
determine whether the prejudice
resulted: ' Only the presence of counsel
could have enabled this accused to
know all the defenses available to
him and to plead intelligently ." '
White v Maryland, supra.
Also, Justice Cohen, dissenting in the
Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth ex rel

-15Maisenhelder v Rundle, 198 A. 2d 565, ( 1964)
observed that:
Even though there is no showing
of prejudice, I would reverse
since the rationale of White v State
of Maryland. . .
and Hamil ton v
Alabama ..• does not require such
a showing.
11

The argument that a preliminary hearing is
a critical stage in a criminal proceeding acquires
added force by the Utah legislation adopted in 1965
which provides for the appointment of counsel at or
before the preliminary hearing.

77-64- 4 Utah

Code Attotated, 1953, as amended. Also, the extension of the constitutional right to counsel
established in Escobedo v Illinois, 3 78 U. S. 4 78
(1964), indicates the" critical" nature of that stage
of the criminal proceeding. There, the court held
that an accused had been denied the assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment as made
obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth

-16;..mendment where a criminal ir:vestigation begins to
focus upon particular suspects and the suspect has
requested and been denied opportunity to consult
with the lawyer. Justice Gdd:Oerg, writing the
'.Tlajority opinion, said:
"The 'guilding hand of counsel' was
essential to advise petitioner of his
rights in this delicate situation.
Powell v Alabama*** This was the
' stage when legal aid and advice'
were the most critical to petitioner.
Massiah v United States*** It was
a stage surely as critical as was the
arraignment in Hamil ton v Alabama
*** and the preliminary hearing in
White v Maryland***"
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the aid of competent
counsel at every stage of the criminal proceeding is
a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed at all
critical stages in a criminal proceeding. A preLminary hearing is a critical stage in a criminal
]'.Croceeding for which an accused is entitled to

-17counsel. Judge Beck denied appellant his
constitutional right to counsel at the preliminary
hearing when he accepted the waiver of said hearing without furnishing counsel prior thereto. It is
elementary that an accused must clearly understand
the nature the right he is asked to waive before he
actually waives that right or before he can be said
to have waived that right and appellant could not
clearly understand the nature of that right without
counsel.
Appellant earnestly submits that he has
been denied the right to counsel at a critical stage
in the criminal proceeding in- violation of his
constitutional rights and that the Court should
reverse the conviction herein.
Respectfully submitted,
WILFORD A. BEESLEY
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

